Until recently having or not having nuclear weapons appeared to be and was treated as a question of yes or no. From now on it will make more sense to describe a country nuclear-weapons status not with a yes or a no but with a time schedule (Schelling, 1976).

The above paragraph is an extract from Thomas Schelling’s piece ‘Who Will have The Bomb’, written in the aftermath of India’s first ‘peaceful’ nuclear explosive (PNE) in 1974. India’s PNE was viewed by the international community as a learning lesson where sensitive technology/material transferred for peaceful purposes was diverted towards military use. It was alleged that the Indian PNE had been carried out using plutonium from the CIRUS reactor (Canada-India Research US) supplied by Canada and heavy water (for the reactor) from the US. The three decades sanctions on India came to a substantive end only with former US president George Bush and Indian prime minister Manhoman Singh’s official joint statement for US-India civil nuclear cooperation in 2005.

The ‘123’ agreement, as the US-India civil cooperation agreement had been termed, is of course by no means anywhere close to the deal that the P5 + 1 (Germany) have any intentions to offer Iran. However, the numbers 123 might be applied to the Iranian case as symbolic of the 1, 2 and 3 round of negotiations that have taken place in just these last two months between Iran and the P5+1 on preventing Iran from developing any possible weapons program and to keep a check on Iran’s claimed ‘peaceful use’. The first round of negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran were held in Istanbul, Turkey (between April 13 and 14 in Istanbul), the recent second meeting at Baghdad, Iraq (May 23rd- 24th); and now the third and highly anticipated round of negotiations are to begin in Moscow (on June 17th).

The pertinent question to be asked then is, what are the possible outcomes in this third round and what might a deal with Iran look like? At the very outset it might be noted that the dominant rhetoric today has changed from what it was even a few months ago, when the world community discussed an Israeli attack on Iran’ nuclear facility as a highly probable possibility. However, the recent rhetoric has been one of using ‘sanctions’ but so as to ‘negotiate’ and ‘persuade’ relying on ‘diplomacy’ rather than only threats of use of force. Thus, the pressure from sanctions has not only forced Tehran to the negotiating table but has also ensured its continuous presence and commitment to ‘negotiations’.

This is matched by the domestic rhetoric in Iran wherein a particular statement by the Iranian supreme religious leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei this year gave some legitimacy to Iran’s claims that ‘the Iranian nation has never pursued and will never pursue nuclear weapons,’ thus linking the issue to a religious rationale stating that ‘the Islamic Republic, logically, religiously and theoretically, considers the possession of nuclear weapons a grave sin and believes the proliferation of such weapons is senseless, destructive and dangerous.’ As Hossein Mousavian, former spokesmen for Iran’s nuclear negotiating team and author of the forthcoming book, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir, in his very recent interview with Tom Carver (vice-president for communications and strategy at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) stated that ‘definitely there is a more positive atmosphere...not only in the West...... also within Iranian public opinion and Iranian politicians’.

So given the above scenario, let’s say there are reasons that suffice the belief that both sides are in for a ‘give and take’ in these negotiations and thus the possible outcomes will be focal points that will enable cooperation on this issue between Iran and the international community represented in these negotiations by P5+1. In that case, the pertinent question is what are the possible focal points for a coordinated outcome and how and why they should be reached? Drawing on the existing discussions on Iran, I highlight only two such important focal points for a possible deal and discuss how and why these might be achievable.

One such focal point as Fareed Zakaria writes in his piece on Iran negotiations is a ‘smart compromise’. The compromise is that Iran may be asked to stop enriching uranium to 20 percent, the level from which fuel can easily be converted for weapons purposes. However, this will need to be done with an acknowledgment (on part of the P5+1) of recognizing Iran’s enrichment right as a NPT member and as embodied in Article IV of the treaty, thus allowing Iran to continue to enrich uranium up to only 3.5 or 5 percent. To add to this, the possibility of this above compromise is higher if Iran agrees to ship its existing stockpile of uranium that has already been enriched up to 20 percent, which Iran claims is for medical isotopes. On the other hand, the P5+1 will have to match Iran’s concession of shipping existing uranium with a formal agreement and not just a vocal commitment, to ship completed fuel plates in return to Iran, which can be used in the process of making medical isotopes.

How and why this is a possibility is because this solution lies within the Non-Proliferation Treaty and not beyond it thus making it more fair and acceptable to Iran. Earlier Iran was being asked to give up any uranium enrichment leading to a scenario of zero enrichment, which Iran was not ready to accept in any circumstance. As Hossein Mousavian, states that ‘they (i.e. P5+1) have admitted the principle of reciprocity’ and Iran itself is more interested in the end-game looking at ‘the broad package’ rather than ‘a piecemeal approach.’ Thus, an end game for Iran will have to involve some ‘take-away’ as well.

The second focal point relates to the IAEA involvement and Iran’s nuclear sites. Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu has publicly demanded that Iran shut down its Fordo Nuclear Plant in a mountain near Qom, a demand that Iran is unlikely to accept. Iran has claimed that the facility is for peaceful purposes and therefore has a right to position its nuclear facility wherever it desires.  I agree with Fareed Zakaria who suggests that ‘Washington should soften its stance on this issue as long as Iran accepts intrusive inspections so it can be independently confirmed that the program is peaceful.’ And this is possible if Iran agrees to provide IAEA access to its sites giving the IAEA opportunities to be satisfied that there are no such military programs. This will also increase mutual confidence.

However, Iran it seems is unlikely to accept this on face value or mere vocal commitments and therefore a relaxation of some sanctions might serve as an incentive for Iran to cooperate with the IAEA. Therefore, bringing in the IAEA and strengthening its role in this regard as an independent body is more likely to add legitimacy to the existing and prevalent diplomatic route of P5+1. As Mark Hibbs, Ariel (Eli) Levite, Pierre Goldschmidt state in their analysis that the ‘IAEA track will prove absolutely essential to making the diplomatic track a success, because it will test Iran’s sincerity in reaching an agreement with the six powers (the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany) negotiating with Tehran.’

How and why this is a possibility derives from Iran’s bilateral relationship with IAEA in the past as Iran as a NPT member has signed a safeguards agreement with IAEA and it was the IAEA that has acted as a watchdog in the past informing and confirming reports of Iran’s undeclared nuclear facilities. Thus, IAEA’s role is critical to the extent of maintaining the legitimacy of that agreement that Iran has committed itself to as a NPT member. Moreover, such an approach might also benefit Iran as it provides Iran leverage in the negotiations and the ability to claim an active engagement with the IAEA in the past as an effort to persuade the international community that its overt intentions, if true, are indeed only peaceful and nothing else. This is therefore a confidence-building measure that may benefit both sides.

The negotiations in Moscow will of course re-highlight the commitment to the peaceful use of the atom.  But what these negotiations have also highlighted is, as Schelling wrote in 1976, that the question ‘Who will have the Bomb’ or if applied to the present context ‘Does Iran have the Bomb’ can no longer be answered as simply as a ‘Yes or a No’. And probably in Iran’s case technically speaking, the answer might even be a ‘No’. The problem therefore is two-pronged, the first being to prevent Iran from getting ‘it’ but also preventing Iran from buying the time to ‘get it.’ Therefore, this third round of negotiations will require a genuine set of commitments and a ‘give and take’ on both ends; more so for the Iranian government as that is where lies not only the burden of proof but importantly an accountability to the Iranian People.