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“Pending bills, disrupted sessions, no legislation. Maybe it’s time for parliament to go,” argues Shashi Tharoor in Tehelka’s cover story “Shall We Call The President?” Tharoor argues that India’s parliamentary system is “primarily responsible for our principal political ills” and hence it’s time for India to shift to a presidential system like that of the US.  He argues that India needs “strong executives” who are directly elected at the centre (president), state (governor), and local level (mayor, panchayat and zilla president).

For the proposed system, like France’s electoral process, there would be two rounds of voting: first among all those who want to contest, then between the two highest vote-getters of the first round. However, the form of government which Tharoor advocates for India is the American presidential system where the president is both the head of state and government and not the French model which combines the presidential and parliamentary form of government.
The current system, Tharoor argues, has created MPs that are “unqualified to legislate”; instead our “unruly legislators” enter into fisticuffs and fling slippers and microphones at each other. He feels that parliamentary system is not suited for a country like India where the ideology of every party is a variant of “centrist populism” derived from the “Nehruvian socialism” with the same set of “rhetorical clichés” - socialism, secularism, mixed economy and non-alignment.

Tharoor feels that presently the main reason for entering parliament is to attain governmental office and this has resulted in executive posts being given to “those who are electable rather than to those who are able”. Tharoor flags three more problems with the present system - the malaise of defection and horse-trading, the weakening of legislature with executive making most laws and opposition parties disrupting law-making as it knows that its votes do not make a difference.

Tharoor, unlike Ambedkar, seems to favour the “stability” and “performance” of the presidential system over the “responsibility” and “accountability” which the parliamentary system offers. The stress is on efficiency, performance and “delivering results”. Under the present system, Tharoor argues, dissension by a coalition or supporting party hampers “decisive action” and holds the “executive hostage to the agendas of a range of motley partners”. He also argues that under the parliamentary system, politicians appeal to the narrow identities of religion, caste and region while the presidential system will make candidates demand an “India for the Indians”.

These arguments aren’t new. Some of the concerns Tharoor has raised are indeed serious. But having “unqualified” and “unruly” legislators (terms which smack of elitism) isn’t a reason good enough to destroy our parliament. Finding common ground in socialism, secularism, mixed economy and non-alignment in a diverse country like India is not something that should be loathed. Tharoor might call the pragmatic and people-centric policies of India’s political parties “centrist populism” but this, I believe even Tharoor would concede, is better than parties chained by the extremes of ideological dogmatism.

A system which requires the ministers of the cabinet to be “electable”, regardless of their “ability”, is not unfavourable or unreasonable in a democracy. If Tharoor’s unease is situated in the fact that people with dubious distinctionsare elected (and then go on to become ministers) the solution isn’t the termination of the parliamentary system but the introduction of electoral reforms which lay higher standards for contesting elections. Tharoor wants a directly-elected chief executive that is “able to appoint a cabinet of talents”.

However, even in the present system, any person can be appointed to the cabinet provided that he becomes a Lok Sabha or Rajya Sabha member within six months. Hence Manmohan Singh became a finance minister before he got in the Rajya Sabha and more recently, Prithviraj Chavan became a chief minister when he was actually an MP and not an MLA. Having a parliamentary system doesn’t mean that experts are denied appointment to organs of the state.  Hence we have people like Montek Singh Ahluwalia (planning commission), C Rangaragan (economic advisory council), Sam Piroda (national innovation council) and Nandan Nilekani (Unique Identification Authority) appointed to prime positions in government bodies without having won any elections.

The other defects of the parliamentary system which Tharoor points out - defection, executive law-making and opposition disruption - can be addressed by having a relook at the anti-defection law of 1985. Under this law, brought by the 52nd constitutional amendment, a member of parliament may be disqualified by the speaker if he votes contrary to the directions of his party. This law has however come under severe criticism from many quarters. The law commission had made a recommendation that whips should be issued by a party only when “the voting in the house affects the continuance of the government.”

By limiting the binding of party whips to no-confidence motions, an MP’s right to vote on legislation and policy based on his conscience is protected. This would also mean that laws cant me made merely on the strength of the ruling party’s numbers. Hence the question of the executive pushing through laws does not arise. Implementing this reform also ensures that the separation of powers between the legislature and executive is less ambiguous. There would be more meaningful deliberations in parliament and the opposition members will not be reduced to slogan-shouters. Another reform could be the allocation of more time to private members bills. So all these concerns, though genuine, can be solved without abandoning the parliamentary system.

Though Tharoor has peppered his arguments with seemingly grave problems of our parliamentary democracy, there is very little that remains in support of the presidential system except the rhetoric of efficiency, performance, good governance etc. Notions which are hugely popular among India’s middle class which have long been disillusioned by our politics. One of the problems with such a narrative is that in the name of furthering efficiency that is supposedly blocked by India’s current democratic framework, we are in danger of entering the slippery slope the ends up restricting democracy.

Admittedly, in the age of coalition politics, smaller parties can exercise disproportionate influence in the working of the government. But even a group such as Anna Hazare’s, which has no representatives in parliament, is seen to be dictating terms to parliament. As a multi-party democracy the nature of decision-making is based on consensus and this, with all its disadvantages, is not undesirable when one looks at various interests that are to be considered in a diverse country like India. For “decisive action” what is needed is decisive leadership (which is largely missing in the present government) regardless of whether it is a government with single-party majority, coalition partners or a directly elected president.

Concentration of power and lesser accountability that the presidential system offers is not something which we can afford. And to think that a presidential candidate would only appeal for an “India for the Indians” and not assert religious and other identities (As presidential candidates in the US often do) is overly optimistic if not absolutely naïve. However, to his credit, Tharoor has flagged off some important issues plaguing our political system that need to be addressed; but not by destroying the very institutions our founding fathers laid down in the constitution that help us address them.