Maintaining independence in foreign policy is not an easy option for any country, especially when the international geopolitical situation is fluid, alliances are shifting and strategic choices are becoming increasingly complex. How will the new year fare in this regard?

It is instructive to look back in order to look into the future. The year 2025, in particular, will be remembered as one of the most challenging periods for India on the external front: It faced diplomatic, strategic, and geopolitical pressures on its interests from Pakistan and Bangladesh in the neighbourhood, while the US weaponised tariffs to punish it for purchasing cheap oil from Russia. 

Amid such developments, India found its relations with China getting back on track, ties with Russia further solidifying, and a fresh momentum building in its engagement with the European Union, the 27 countries’ bloc that is on the verge of concluding the Free Trade Agreement with New Delhi. Ties with West Asia remained stable, while Africa and Latin American countries continued to expand.

Chill in India-US ties 
Yet what shocked India was US president Donald Trump’s repeated claim that it mediated a ceasefire between India and Pakistan during their four-day conflict in May. Despite prime minister Narendra Modi maintaining in categorical terms that there was no call from Trump during the conflict with Pakistan, the US president kept repeating his statement.

Amid concerns that Trump might resort to unpredictable theatrics, Modi, despite being invited by Egyptian president Abdel Fattah El Sisi and the US president, skipped a gathering in Sharm el-Sheikh where 20 world leaders, including Pakistan PM Shehbaz Sharif had gathered for the peace summit on Gaza on October 13, 2025. 

Instead, Minister of State for External Affairs Kirti Vardhan Singh was sent to attend the peace summit which was called to discuss the ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas. Though Congress leader Shashi Tharoor had questioned Modi’s decision to skip the peace summit, it appeared to be a calculated move aimed at avoiding sharing international stage with the Pakistan PM, an opportunity which Trump could have utilized for mediation theatrics or political optics.

However, it was not an isolated incident of Modi avoiding direct contact with Trump. The Indian PM also skipped the ASEAN summit, which was hosted by Malaysia during October 26-28. Even as on September 10, 2025, Trump in a post on his social media platform Truth Social had said, “I look forward to speaking with my very good friend, Prime Minister Modi, in the upcoming weeks.” Earlier, Modi skipped the UN General Assembly meeting. This indicated a chill in relations between India and the US with its impact clearly visible on trade, diplomacy, and strategy. 

In the past 12 months, except for vice president J. D. Vance, no high-ranking officials from the US under the Trump administration visited India. Those who landed here included Allison Hooker, the US under secretary of state for political affairs, (she visited New Delhi just two days after Russian president Vladimir Putin paid a visit to New Delhi to hold an annual summit with Modi) and deputy US trade representative Rick Switzer.
 
Although, from the Indian side, Modi, NSA Ajit Doval, external affairs minister Dr S. Jaishankar, finance minister Nirmala Sitharaman, commerce and industry Minister Piyush Goyal and foreign secretary Vikram Misri visited the US in 2025. Amid this, there is also a cruel reality: defence minister Rajnath Singh cancelled his trip to the US in August 2025 because of tension in relations between the two countries. 

Also, no Quad leadership summit could take place. There is no sign of it taking place in 2026 either. The ambassadors of India, Japan, Australia, and the US recently met in Beijing and the Quad foreign ministers twice held meetings: first, shortly after swearing-in of the Trump-2 administration in January in Washington DC and again in July 2025 in Washington DC, but there is no clarity yet on whether the leaders of the four countries will meet in India in 2026.

US’s fresh alignment with Pakistan  
Nonetheless, the freeze in India-US relations has unduly benefited Pakistan as it has managed to deepen its engagement with the US after two decades, thanks to the Trump family’s lucrative cryptocurrency deal. 

In June, Trump hosted Pakistan army chief General Asim Munir at White House for a luncheon meeting. The meeting took place nearly five weeks after Islamabad and New Delhi were engaged in the four-day military conflict over the killing of 26 people in Pahalgam in J&K by terrorists belonging to The Resistance Force (TRF), an offshoot of Lashkar-e-Taiba. 

This was the first time when an Army chief of a country was hosted in White House, signalling clearly a 360-degree shift in Trump’s approach towards Pakistan. During his first term as president, Trump had not only castigated Pakistan for being a haven for terrorists, his administration had also suspended $300 million aid to the country due to “a lack of Pakistani decisive actions” against terrorists.

In his second term, Trump preferred to cold-shoulder India than standing firm against Pakistan, the country which, unlike New Delhi, formally recommended him for the Nobel Peace Prize because of his so-called decisive intervention following the conflict between the two countries in May 2025. 

Happy with Pakistan’s adjustment with his personal ambition, Trump approved a major arms deal worth $686 million to provide advanced technology upgrades and sustainment support for Islamabad’s F-16 fighter fleet. Some analysts saw it as the US’s pressure tactics on India as it refused to buy F-35 jets. Whatever was the truth, the US’s coziness with Pakistan has its impact on the latter’s relations with India.

Growing tension between India and Pakistan
The year 2025 will be remembered for the escalation of tension between India and Pakistan after the Pahalgam incident. For the first time, India, to teach Pakistan a lesson, not only carried out precision attacks on nine terrorist camps and wiped-out top leaders of outfits such as Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba, but also inflicted huge damage on Pakistan’s military capability during conflict in May. 

Besides undertaking military actions, the decision to put in abeyance the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty hit Pakistan hard. By suspending the IWT, India, in fact, sent a strong message to Pakistan that so long as it would continue to serve as a safe sanctuary for terrorists, it would have to face consequences. India made it clear that blood and water cannot flow together.

Crisis in India-Bangladesh ties 
External affairs minister Dr S Jaishankar chose to visit Dhaka on December 31 to represent the Indian government at the funeral of Begum Khaleda Zia, former prime minister of Bangladesh, and chairperson of Bangladesh Nationalist Party. 

Against the backdrop of continuing violence against minorities and targeted killing of Hindus coupled with soured relations with India, EAM Jaishankar’s visit surprised many strategic thinkers in the country. But it was a gamble that India played keeping in mind the stability of the region while making 2026 and years ahead less challenging for it in the neighbourhood in comparison to the year 2025. 

Bangladesh, under the interim government-led by chief adviser Muhammad Yunus, has evolved into next Pakistan with Islamists-led by the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) and the National Citizen Party (NCP) bent on to tear apart the fabric of secularism after the ouster of the Sheikh Hasina government in August 2024. 

Bangladesh has emerged as a challenge for India’s security in the northeast region. Muhammad Yunus’s pronounced anti-India stance, combined with his deep hatred for ousted Bangladesh prime minister Sheikh Hasina and her Awami League party, have driven him closer to Pakistan, a country that has yet to apologize for the genocide committed by its armed forces during Bangladesh’s 1971 Liberation War.

As per media reports, Bangladesh and Pakistan are moving closer to a planned Mutual Defence Agreement, which would expand military cooperation, intelligence sharing and joint military training. The agreement, if finalized, is expected to be signed after a new government is formed in Bangladesh after the elections. Experts say the Pakistani military has a history of gaining political leverage, deep strategic and intelligence footholds after the signing of military pact with a nation.

Resetting in ties with China 
Modi, who did not visit China since 2018, as relations between the two countries worsened particularly after the Galwan Valley incident in June 2020, travelled to Tianjin on August 31, 2025 to attend the leadership summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
  
Ice started melting between the two Asian giants after Modi and Chinese president Xi Jinping held a meeting on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Kazan in Russia in October 2024.

In the same period, two countries completed troops’ disengagement at the two friction points in eastern Ladakh’s Demchok and Depsang Plains. Experts say reset in relations between the two countries was brought about more by changing global alignment, economic pressure, and strategic compulsions than by any other factor.

Deepening India’s relations with Russia 
India’s relations with Russia witnessed further momentum following the visit of Putin in December 2025 for an annual summit with Modi. It was the first visit after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. 

The Russian president’s visit helped in reaffirming long-standing trust and mutual understanding between the two countries. It also made it clear that neither ups-and-downs of geopolitics nor Trump’s imposition of tariff or sanctions would cast a shadow on their relationship, anchored in decades of strategic convergence.

During Putin’s visit, both countries committed to achieve a $100 billion target in bilateral trade well before 2030. A major step towards strengthening economic ties was their decision to continue bilateral trade through the Rupee-Ruble mechanism. India-Russia also agreed to maintain their consultations on enabling the interoperability of the national payment systems, financial messaging systems, as well as central bank digital currency platforms.
 
Yet, no major announcement in the area of defence was made. Experts argued that it was so in order to avoid attracting sanctions from the US and its European allies, who are already unhappy with India for not pressurising Russia to end war with Ukraine.

Pragmatic engagement with West Asia
Thanks to energy security, trade, and diaspora connections, West Asia continues to occupy a central place in India’s foreign policy. In the year 2025 alone, Modi visited the region twice: First, in April when he visited Saudi Arabia and second, in December when he visited Jordan and Oman. In terms of energy security, West Asia remains India’s largest supplier of crude oil, accounting for over 42% of the total imports. 

The Gulf region, in particular, has acquired strategic importance in India’s external outreach. Home to over 9 million Indian diaspora, New Delhi’s engagement with the region has transcended from merely buyer-seller relationship to truly strategic partnership in the recent past with both sides working closely in areas such as defence, critical technologies, and space.  

Growing equation with Europe 
Driven by fast changing geopolitical situations and supply chain disruptions, India’s relations with Europe gained renewed momentum in the year 2025. Though the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war exposed underlying differences in relations between the two sides, yet New Delhi chose to display diplomatic and strategic maturity in dealing with its engagement with Europe. Its reflection could be seen in India’s decision to conclude a Free Trade Agreement with the UK, while negotiations with the European Union on the FTA were in the final stage.

In the area of defence, France continued to be a major defence supplier to India, exemplified by the Rafale fighter jets and cooperation in naval platforms and space. Other European countries showed keen interest in defence exports and co-production, aligning with India’s self-reliance initiative.

Conclusion
Overall, the year 2025 served both challenges and opportunities for India. Yet, decisions taken on the external front suggested that India was comfortable operating in a fragmented world, where partnerships are situational and interests trump sentiments. As global alignments continue to shift, India’s challenge in the year 2026 will be not merely to balance relations, but to convert diplomatic resilience into long-term strategic advantage.