There has been a great deal of debate around how should have the international community responded to the Libyan situation? Differences arise because there isn’t a consensus that may legitimately be termed "international". A few major powers support the military intervention but then there are other nations that have condemned it and called for a ceasefire. India is one of them along with China that together represent nearly 37% of the world's population. With mixed responses from within the African Union as well that accounts for nearly 15% of the world’s population, this may be seen as a decision that is not supported by nations that represent nearly 50% of the world’s people. Yet, an international coalition between a few nations has succeeded instead of a global coalition based on a global consensus and the world is witnessing what the leaders of this coalition are careful to term a 'multilateral intervention' and not a 'unilateral' decision in Libya.

While this itself is an important debate, a further pertinent normative and moral question emerges given the current scenario – Is this a right and only approach to challenging Gaddafi and supporting the rebel forces in Libya? And, after all this, what is the end game in Libya?

Analysts have offered diverse views on what would have been the right approach to the Libyan situation? Here, I suggest a middle path, for surely the world must not sit quietly and watch a dictator crush a symbolic revolution for democracy, something that was rarely imagined in the Arab countries, but then a military intervention with air attacks is also not the only answer to controlling the situation in Libya. The latter point is important because of the unforeseen and very likely long-term consequence of such an intervention that may be difficult to predict precisely at this moment, but given the previous experiences should at least be considered in a formal plan. It is these long-term consequences that call for a mixed approach employing both a logic of consequences along with a logic of appropriateness. While the intervention, after much internal dissent and discussion has now been handed over to NATO that plans to focus on 'short-term success', it is still difficult to say how short really short-term will be! Short-term success is not sufficient to overlook long-term consequences that will follow this intervention as and when it succeeds to overthrow Gaddafi.

More importantly, the policy to support the rebels in some form should have been made much earlier as the momentum was set up and with Mubarak being forced to step down in Egypt, there seemed enough legitimacy established for people’s revolution against their dictator regimes. That momentum should have been harnessed to put immense international pressure on Gaddafi through the UN starting a dialogue with top officials in Gaddafi’s military. Strategies of shaming the regime and encouraging Gaddafi’s supporters to defect should not have been undermined at such an early stage. Defection within Gaddafi's supporters, especially key military officials, would indeed have been an important strategy to undermine Gaddafi’s strength. A clear dialogue should have been opened with Gaddafi, his sons and senior officials while a simultaneous strategy could have been formulated on the side so as to provide humanitarian and relief support to rebels and also a military support if need be at the right time.

A delayed “international response” itself has been a major drawback and while a popular adage states it is “better late than never”, international situations of this kind do call for a quick response for a successful and effective outcome. All this should have been done at an early stage and not delayed by a few weeks where the world has watched not only the internal differences within the international community and NATO on Libya but the Arab league itself, A concerted and unanimous approach through the UN-based on sanctions, promoting defection among key military officials and unanimous international condemnation by all members of international community would have been an appropriate approach. As President Obama himself stated in his recent speech but failed short of practising effectively: "We believe that force should not be the first option. So, whenever possible, we turn to alternatives that might change behaviour – condemnation that puts violators on notice, sanctions that increase pressure, embargoes that block arms to aggressors, and accountability for those who commit crimes. And should those prove insufficient, we have to be prepared to take the necessary measures to uphold international peace and security and protect innocent people. That’s what we’re doing in Libya."

Yet, many important questions remain unanswered despite Arab League’s symbolic and active support to the coalition for a no-fly zone with Qatar also agreeing to send fighter jets that has worked to bestow an international legitimacy on the allies’ coalition. While President Obama reiterated that this is not a unilateral intervention but is supported by the UN, EU as well as the voice of the Arab and the US has proclaimed itself as a central supporter and not a leader of the coalition, emphasising its collective legitimacy, some issues need further deliberation.

The long-term policy goal cannot be the removal of Gaddafi alone but a well-formulated plan is needed as to what do to next even if Gaddafi leaves? How to minimise any clashes between the rebels and Gaddafi supporters (civilians) even after Gaddafi’s regime is crushed. Who will be accountable and responsible for a post-Gaddafi Libyan situation?

As the UN Security Council passed the resolution authorising a no-fly zone and 'all necessary measures' to protect civilians in Libya and while there are speculations of President Obama having signed a secret presidential finding authorising covert operations to aid the effort in Libya where rebels are in full retreat despite air support from US and allied forces. There remains a gap between the UN Security Council resolution 1973, this underlying aim of getting Gaddafi out of power, and finally an accountable, transparent and effective plan of what happens next as and when Gaddafi goes!

We need to bridge this gap so as to avoid the possible pitfalls that the "international coalition" might find itself falling into because of this precarious policy gap between 'Gaddafi must go' and 'Gaddafi is gone'.