It was a meeting at New Delhi’s India International Centre with a difference. Ten citizens, including practitioners and activists, came together on August 10 to discuss just how corruption can be contained. Those who put their heads together to arrive at workable solutions included Karnataka Lokayukta Justice N Santosh Hegde, former chief election commissioner J M Lyngdoh, former chief vigilance commissioner P Shankar, supreme court advocate Prashant Bhushan, director of Common Cause Kamal Jaswal and his  colleague Sarvesh Sharma, and social activists Arvind Kejriwal, Nikhil Dey, Shekhar Singh and Suhas Borkar. Pratyush Sinha, the central vigilance commissioner at the time also attended the meeting as an observer.

Here is what they identified as the systemic deficiencies and the response required to overcome these deficiencies:

Central Mechanism
At central government level, we have  entral vigilance commission (CVC), departmental vigilance wings and Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). The CVC and departmental vigilance wings deal with vigilance (disciplinary proceedings) aspect of  corruption cases and CBI deals with the criminal aspect.

- It does not have direct powers or administrative control over departmental vigilance wings, which are controlled by respective departments. Though it is consulted in appointing of chief vigilance officers (CVOs) the final decision lies with the government.
- Appointments to the CVC are directly under the control of ruling political party, though the leader of the opposition is a member of the selection committee. Only those names are considered which the government provides. The appointments are opaque.
- The CVC Act gives supervisory powers to the CVC over CBI. However, these powers are ineffective. CVC does not have the power to call for any file or direct investigation in a particular way. Besides, CBI is under administrative control of the department of personnel and training.
- Therefore, though CVC is relatively independent in its functioning it neither has resources nor powers to enquire or take action against corruption.

Departmental Vigilance Wings: Each department has a vigilance wing, which is manned by officials from the same department, barring a few which have an outsider as CVO.
- Since officers in the vigilance wing are from the same department and can be posted to any position in that department, it is practically impossible for them to act independently and objectively while
enquiring into complaints against their colleagues and seniors, like the head of the department under which they directly function.
- In some departments, especially in the ministries, some officials get additional duty of a vigilance official. So, if a complaint is against that officer he is the one who will enquire into it. Even if a complaint against that officer is made to the CVC or the HoD or to any other authority, it is forwarded back to him. If he recuses, the case is handled by his juniors. There are indeed examples of such absurdity.
- There have been instances of officials with corrupt past posted in vigilance wing. While in vigilance, they either try to scuttle cases against themselves or do more of the same by closing cases for consideration. Or target inconvenient officers.
- Departmental vigilance does not investigate criminal cases. It can’t register an FIR.

CBI: CBI has powers of a police station to investigate and register FIR. It can investigate any case related to a central government department on its own or when referred to it by a state government or a court.
- CBI is overburdened and does not  accept cases even when amount of  defalcation is alleged to be around  Rs 1 crore.
- CBI is directly under the administrative control of central government.
- So, if a complaint pertains to a minister or politician who is part of the  ruling coalition or a bureaucrat close to them, CBI’s credibility has suffered and there is increasing public perception that it cannot do a fair investigation and that it is influenced to scuttle the cases.
- Again, because CBI is directly under the centre, it is perceived to have been used to settle scores against inconvenient politicians.
Therefore, if a citizen wants to make a complaint about corruption by a politician or an official in the central government, there isn’t a single anti-corruption agency which is effective and independent of the government.

In States
The situation is worse in the states. All vigilance agencies (state vigilance department, departmental vigilance wings) and anti-corruption agencies (anti-corruption department of state police, CID etc) are directly under the control of state and therefore, ineffective against political bosses. In some states, we have the institution of Lokayukta.

Lokayukta:
- Lokayukta cannot initiate investigation or prosecution. They have to seek permission of state to investigate cases involving officials above certain levels. They play advisory roles and their recommendations are not binding.
- In some states, vigilance department has power over bureaucrats and Lokayukta investigate politicians. Such division of jurisdiction hampers investigation. And in a case involving both politician and bureaucrats (which is the case most of the times), both Lokayukta and the vigilance department feel handicapped.
- They also do not have adequate resources to investigate large number of complaints they receive.
- Lokayukta is appointed by the state government in non-transparent and arbitrary manner. In some states, their independence has been seriously eroded.
Therefore, there isn’t any effective anti-corruption agency either at the centre or states, which is independent of political executive and has powers and resources to investigate and prosecute.

What Needs to be Done:
a. Central government should immediately pass the Lokpal Bill to set up a strong and effective anti-corruption watchdog. Those states which have Lokayuktas should amend the law to make them strong and effective. Those which don’t should institute the Lokayukta.
b. Lokpal at the centre and Lokayukta in states should be the single apex, independent and effective anti-corruption agency.
c. Lokpal/Lokayukta should be a multi-member body with members with sound legal and administrative backgrounds and social activists etc.
d. All vigilance agencies should be put under their direct control. In states, state vigilance departments and departmental vigilance wings should be merged with Lokayukta. This was done in Karnataka when the Lokayukta was instituted in 1984.
e. At centre, the CVC should be put under the superintendence of the Lokpal. All departmental vigilance wings should also be placed directly and completely (including administrative) under its control. CVC would ensure that the officials get rotated between different departments so that an official does not enquire against officers of his parent department. CVC would then be able to seek compliance of its directions. This would save expenses.
f. At state level, the anti-corruption departments of state police and that portion of CID which deals with corruption, should be completely (both administratively and functionally) under the Lokayukta. Likewise, at central level, that part of CBI which deals with corruption, should be completely (both administratively and functionally) under the Lokpal.
g. Lokayukta and Lokpal should have jurisdiction over both politicians and bureaucrats.
h. Lokayukta and Lokpal should have complete financial autonomy and autonomy to select their own staff.
i. Once enquiry (in vigilance cases) or investigations (in criminal cases) are over, the findings should be presented before the full Lokayukta/Lokpal which would, after hearing the accused, decide the course of action without requiring any sanction for prosecution.
j. Advice of Lokpal/Lokayukta in vigilance matters should be binding. In criminal cases, Lokayukta/Lokpal should directly initiate prosecution.
k. For legal purposes, Lokpal/Lokayukta should be declared as police officers under section 36 of the CrPC.
l. All records related to a case shall be made public after enquiry/investigation is complete.
m. All complaints filed in Lokpal/Lokayukta should be compulsorily enquired/investigated, preferably in a time bound manner.
n. Lokpal/Lokayukta should have the following powers:
- Powers of a civil court to summon any officers and documents
- Powers of search and seizure
- Powers to ensure compliance of their orders. This could include financial penalties also
- Powers to issue interim orders to stop or alter any government activity to ensure that corruption is stopped forthwith. The orders should be binding.
o. Lokpal should be selected in the following manner:
-  A search and screening committee consisting of the following members should be made. This committee could be formed through either of the following two methods: (1) The committee could consist of five members. One member each could be suggested by a collegium of: five senior-most chief justices of high courts, five senior-most Lokayuktas, a committee of leaders of opposition and chairpersons of the two houses of parliament and other such collegiums. After a few years, one member could be suggested by a group of all former Lokpals.
Or, (2) The committee could consist of 15 members which are heads of certain institutions and individuals holding certain positions who shall be treated as ex-officio members - like directors of say two IITs, directors of two IIMs, editors of two national dailies, president of supreme court bar association, presidents of some professional bodies etc.
- Appropriate criteria should be worked out for screening and short-listing candidates.
- Candidates should be subjected to public hearings on the lines of confirmation hearings in the US, though these hearings will be for selection and not confirmation.
- On the basis of the above procedures, the screening committee shall recommend names twice the number of vacancies to the selection committee, which would consist of prime minister, leader
of opposition and chief justice of India.
- The selection committee shall then recommend names to the president of India for final appointment.
p. Lokayukta of a state shall also be selected similarly.
q. Whistle-blower protection: Ordinarily, police shall protect those who get threats. But if someone is dissatisfied Lokayukta/Lokpal should be empowered to issue appropriate directions to the police with powers to get their orders implemented. It was felt that in most of such cases, identity of the whistle-blower is ordinarily known. Therefore, the best deterrent against threats would be thorough and quick investigation.
r. Lokayukta and Lokpal should be created through constitutional amendments.